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Abstract. According to a bedrock assumption in the current methodology of armchair philosophy, 
we may refute a theory aiming at analyzing a concept by providing a counterexample in which it 
intuitively seems that a hypothetical or real situation does not fit with what the theory implies. In 
this paper, we shall argue that this assumption is at most either untenable or otherwise useless in 
bringing about what is commonly expected from it.
0. Introduction
According to a bedrock assumption in the current methodology of armchair philosophy, we 
may refute a theory aiming at analyzing a concept by providing a counterexample in which it 
intuitively seems that a hypothetical or real case does not fit with what the theory implies. In 
this paper, we shall argue that this assumption is, at most, either untenable or otherwise 
useless in bringing about what is commonly expected from it. This paper is not going to
assert anything affirmatively about this method. We deliberately restricted ourselves to 
disprove a widely-accepted idea around the role of the counterexample method in armchair 
philosophy without going further to discuss what other functions the counterexample 
method may alternatively have. 
(Before starting the main discussion, it is worth contemplating a methodological 
point relevant to this paper, which can hardly be overemphasized. We, authors, do 
acknowledge that the conclusion of the main argument of this paper, if plausible, denies a 
widely accepted principle of philosophy methodology. However, no compelling
counterargument against this paper may essentially appeal to the fact that a great amount of 
philosophical practices is at odds with the conclusion of the argument. Generally speaking, 
to undermine a theory or argument by appealing to what allegedly happens in an area, rather 
than what epistemically and justifiedly ought to happen or what actually happens there, 
from a methodological point of view, is just a begging the question against skepticism about 
the area. In fact, a methodologically plausible objection against our argument must be 
premise-sensitive rather than conclusion-sensitive. The latter sort is of little evidential interest, as it 
merely trivially repeats the negation of the conclusion as an objection to the argument; 
while the former takes pains to undermine the argument by committing itself to rationally 
question and refute a premise; and probably bears plausibility. Moreover, if anyone objects 
to this argument on the ground that philosophers apply the counterexample method 
extensively, or that such and such premises of our argument lead to a conclusion 
inconsistent with what supposedly happens within philosophy community, or that there are 
such and such (merely logically) possible alternatives to our premises or conclusion, we are 
happy for one read what we said, but we are sad because of hearing from the critic nothing 
beyond his or her mere disagreement expression.)       
First, suppose we have a target theory T that analyzes the concept C as follows:
T: x is an instance of C if and only if x satisfies conditions K1, K2, …
Next, suppose it is asserted that we have found a good counterexample against T. 
The critic attempts to challenge the theory by describing a case e in which it intuitively 
seems that what has been described satisfies all Ks but not C (or vice versa).1 This 
provides the critic with a counterexample E against the target theory:
                                                          
1 This qualification will be dropped in the following, of course without loss of generality.
E: e satisfies all Kis, yet it is not an instance of C2.  
That is a widespread general form of undermining philosophical theories whose 
paradigmatic instance is Gettier’s proposed counterexamples (Gettier, 1963). In his 
paper, Gettier first (re)formulates a theory of knowledge according to which to know 
that P is to have a justified true belief that P ( henceforth we call it “JTB-theory”); and in 
order to undermine it, he constructs hypothetical scenarios in which intuitively the 
protagonist satisfies the three conditions above, though he lacks knowledge3. 
1. Epistemic and Semantic Requirements for the Method
Concerning this pattern, there are two clearly necessary requirements, one epistemic 
and the other semantic, for the validity of such counterexamples: (1) The philosophical 
intuition must be a justifiable or reliable source of evidence; and more significantly (2) 
the predicate “C” in E must refer to a concept, say Ce; otherwise E would not express an 
evidence at all.
1.1. Semantic Requirement 
Let us concentrate first on the semantic demand. Suppose a critic of T, intuits that e
although satisfies all Kis, is not an instance of C. The critic truly intuits this proposition only 
if he considers relevant features of the case e and possesses the concept Ce. Now we may 
ask what is the concept possessed4 by the critic, Ce, which is designated by the predicate 
                                                          
2 Goldman (2007) and Goldman et al. (1998) claims this form as the general form of intuitive evidence in 
philosophical analysis. To my knowledge, no one explicitly has challenged this form so far. Although one may find 
this form uneasily applicable to particular cases especially in philosophy of language, I assume that all singular 
evidence in philosophy more or less straightforwardly reducible to this from.  
3 We merely used Gettier’s cases as example throughout this paper. We did so because (1) it is widely taken as a 
successful attempt to undermine a theory; and (2) it is widely taken as a paradigmic instance of using intuitive 
counterexamples in philosophy. However, the conclusion of this paper can be extended more or less 
straightforwardly to many other instances such as Chalmers’ zombie argument (Chalmers, 1996) or Cohen’s lottery 
case (1988).   
4 The notion “concept possession” is a term originated from Bealer’s works on intuition and a priori knowledge. We 
will focus on this notion as we proceed. 
“C” in E? Is it the same concept as designated by “C” in T? Regarding this question, we 
face a dilemma: either “C” refers equivocally to C, that is to say, the concepts designated 
by “C” in the theory is different from the concept possessed by the critic as he intuits E,
or they are identical. 
First, suppose the concept of the critic constituting his evidence is different from the 
concept designated in the theory. In such a case, the evidence, even if true, does not 
refute the theory, simply because the critic’s evidence involves possessing a concept 
about which the proposed theory asserts nothing. To illustrate this possibility, imagine that 
a critic, who is fully informed about the hypothetical cases constructed by Gettier’s paper 
intuits that “the case described in the paper is not an instance of knowledge, though is an 
instance of a justified true belief.” If “knowledge” here refers not to the concept 
Knowledge that is designated by “knowledge” in the JTB-theory, but for example to 
Knowledge*, then clearly the proposed evidence, even if true, does not refute the theory, 
because the JTB-theory does not assert anything about the concept of Knowledge*; the 
theory is supposed to analyze Knowledge rather than Knowledge*.        
Second, suppose the critic’s concept is the same as the concept designated in the 
theory. That is to say, “C” occurred in theory and evidence refers unequivocally. For 
example, it is widely held by philosophers that as one reflects on the Gettier’s scenarios, 
one intuits that the cases described do not instantiate the very concept that the JTB-theory 
aims to analyze. Hence, according to the critic, the JTB-theory was supposed to analyze 
the concept Knowledge designated by the general term “knowledge” (or the verb “know)”5; 
and the JTB-theory’s proposed analysis is to identify Knowledge with Justified-true-belief. But 
afterward, the critic, by reflecting on the Gettier’s scenarios, comes to the belief that 
JTB-theory fails to capture the concept designated by “knowledge” because he thinks, 
the hypothetical protagonist has a justified true belief but, contrary to the JTB-theory’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
5 It seems clear that we use the general term “knowledge” just to identify the concept involved, that is the concept 
referred to by the term. We are not committed to the idea that to have a concept such as knowledge, it is necessary to 
apply its corresponding term in natural language. We return to this issue in short.  
proposal, does not present an instance of the concept of Knowledge which is designated in 
natural language by “knowledge”.        
What already mentioned was a methodic doctrine widely accepted by many, but 
under careful scrutiny, its hidden implausibility may be revealed. As cited before, the 
critic has good counterexample against T only if he has already possessed the 
analysandum concept, or at least possesses it at the moment of intuiting E. But if so, a 
question immediately arises: What epistemic role is the counterexample expected to play 
then? If the critic already possesses the analysandum concept, then why on earth does he 
need the alleged counterexample at all in order to discover that the theory is not true? In 
other words, the critic acknowledges the falsity of the theory as merely upon 
understanding the theory and possessing the analysandum concept. The moment one 
understands the false theory, by comparing the analysis proposed by the false target 
theory with what was already possessed by him as the concept C, one can readily and 
justifiedly conclude that what theory proposes as the true analysis of the analysandum C,
in fact, fails to capture the very same concept already designated by the predicate “C”.  
Particularly, if the reader of the Gettier’s cases has already possessed the concept of 
Knowledge as designated by “knowledge” in natural language, then having been sufficiently 
informed of the JTB-theory, he can compare the compound concept of Justified-true-belief
suggested by the JTB-theory with the already-possessed concept of Knowledge to 
determine whether the JTB-theory’s account is the true one, that is to say whether 
knowledge = justified true belief. In such a case, therefore, determination of the falsity of 
the theory occurs needlessly of essential and genuine cognitive reliance on the 
counterexamples provided by Gettier’s cases. 
Moore’s argument as to why true analysis of a concept is not anything beyond a trivial 
identity concerns the situation just mentioned. Briefly speaking, he maintains that 
regarding the conceptual identity C = C*, either “C” and “C*” mean the same in which 
case the identity is trivial or they do not mean the same in which case the identity is not 
true at all.       
However, it may be claimed that the preceding argument does not exhaust all 
possibilities. Particularly, an advocator may claim that it is consistent that one possesses
the concept of Knowledge and fully understands the JTB-theory while he is not able to
correctly and justifiedly decide, independently of intuitive counterexamples, whether the 
possessed concept of Knowledge is the same as the theory’s proposal, that is Justified-true-
belief. In other words, it is possible, therefore, that not having considered Gettier’s cases, 
one, who possesses the concept of Knowledge, is not able to correctly decide whether or 
not the concept-identity-proposition “Knowledge = Justified true belief” is true. Such a 
circumstance occurs, the advocator says, when for example the critic possesses the 
concept of knowledge inexplicitly. However, the advocator continues, one may still 
justifiedly intuit that the Gettier’s cases are not instances of knowledge, though one 
would not able to correctly decide on the truth value of concept-identity proposition 
“Knowledge = Justified true belief” merely in virtue of possessing the concept of 
Knowledge plus understanding the JTB-theory. 
We may reply by saying that it is embodied in the notion of “concept possession” that if 
one cannot correctly intuit whether concept-identity-proposition involving the concept 
C, such as “C = F”, is true, then he does not possess the concept C. According to this 
response, by definition, concept possession entails somehow correct decision on truth-
values of such concept-identities. 
As an instance of a definition of “concept possession”, we may refer to Bealer’s 
account. Bealer isolates two senses in which a subject is said to possess a concept: First, 
one possesses a concept at least nominally iff the subject has a propositional attitude 
toward some propositions which contain the concept. In this sense, concept possession 
is compatible with incomplete understanding of the concept or misunderstanding a 
concept such as Burge’s (1979) case (Bealer 1999, p. 37).  But he, as we assume 
throughout this paper, acknowledges that in natural language by “concept possession” 
we mean a much stronger sense. He calls the stronger sense “determinate concept 
possession”(Bealer 1999, p. 38). According to him 
“X determinately possesses a given concept iff, for associated test property-identities 
p: x would have intuitions which imply that p is true iff p is true.” (Bealer 1999, p. 41; 
Bealer 1998, p. 223-230)  
However, it is not clear how to analyze “imply” in Bealer’s account. By the way, at 
least one of his examples suggests that we may interpret it as support: Suppose a woman, 
x, determinately possesses the concept multigon; and suppose that the property of being a 
multigon = property of being a closed straight-sided plane figure. According to this 
definition
“X determinately possesses the concept of being a multigon iff: x would have the 
intuition that it is possible for a triangle or a rectangle to be a multigon iff it is true that it 
is possible for a triangle or a rectangle to be a multigon.” (ibid, p. 41)
Here x’s intuition that it is possible for a triangle or a rectangle to be a multigon 
seems to support the concept-identity multigon = being a closed straight-sided plane 
figure. But, contrary to the initial assumption, it seems dubious that x is said to possess 
the concept determinately, since her intuition that it is possible for a triangle or a 
rectangle to be a multigon, indeed, also implies many other clearly false concept-
identities, namely multigon = being a figure made of more than two lines. In other 
words, the concept-identity implied is underdetermined by the intuitive evidence. 
Therefore it is not straightforwardly answered which identity, among mutually exclusive 
concept-identity, implied by the intuition. 
It seems the problem arises due to the fact that Bealer’s account of concept 
possession is not strong enough, for it is consistent with inability to recognize true and 
only true concept-identities involving the concept in question. As the account suggests it 
is sufficient for possessing the concept to have intuition implying the true concept-
identities, which is much weaker a condition than to grasp the implied identity “multigon 
= being a closed straight-sided plane figure” itself. 
Thus, it seems we require a much stronger definition of the notion. We are not to 
propose another account for the notion; rather, for our discussion, suffice it to mention 
the necessary condition discussed above. That is as follows:
(CP) X (determinately) possesses concept C only if x would have true intuitions 
which presuppose that concept-identities in the form of C = F  is true iff C = F is true6.   
To illustrate this, we can say, to have true and only true intuitions which presuppose
that the concept-identity (property-identity) “Knowledge = Justified true belief” is false is
necessary for determinately possessing the concept of Knowledge. What is at issue for us is 
that, as CP also implies, to (determinately) possess a concept it is necessary to be able to 
have correct intuitions which constitutively presupposes the relevant concept-identities. 
Here we acknowledge that presupposition is not a precisely-defined relation, but 
nevertheless, it adequately captures what we need for further discussions. But it is worth 
giving a relatively precise definition for the relation. It might be said:
X’s intuition that P presupposes Q iff X’s intuition that P is based upon the
assumption that Q is true (or to assume Q is cognitively and essentially prior to P-
intuitions). 
Therefore up to now, we have seen that the having an intuitive counterexample 
against a theory requires that (1) “C” in both evidential proposition E and theory refers 
unequivocally to the concept C, the concept in question, since otherwise the evidence, at 
best, would be irrelevant to the assessing the target theory; (2) C is possessed by the 
subject determinately enough; and (3) determinate concept possession entails true 
intuitions which presupposes that the concept-identities are true. (Also throughout this 
paper by “concept possession” we mean the stronger sense of it which is incompatible with 
misunderstanding, that is to say, using Bealer’s terminology, by “concept possession” we 
actually mean “determinate concept possession”.)    
                                                          
6 However, We leave it open whether or not this account truly capture the sufficient condition for determinate 
concept possession.
1.2. Epistemic Requirement  
Now let us return to the second requirement, that is, the epistemic requirement. If 
intuition is to be a reliable or justifiable source of evidence, then one necessary condition 
for the subject who intuits on a case is that the subject possesses the concept in question. 
This requirement seems uncontroversial. It seems that one who is to reliably and 
intuitively judge cases had to already possess the concept in question. If not so, we may 
intelligibly ask based on what ground does one intuit that a case e is (not) an instance of 
C and not otherwise? Clearly, having been fully informed of the case, though necessary, 
is not sufficient for reliability of case-intuition. Rather, besides the satisfying requirement 
discussed above and being fully informed of the relevant properties of the case intuited, 
one has to possess, or using Bealer’s terminology “determinately possess”, the concept 
about which he is making intuitive judgment. 
In considering a case, we should already know of what concept the case allegedly is 
(not) an instance. Otherwise, intuitions on particular cases, either hypothetical or real, 
would be baseless, and thereby unreliable and probably flawed, since there would be no 
criterion to say which properties of the case are (ir)relevant to the instantiation of the 
concept under discussion. The truth is that in virtue of possessing the concept we know 
which property of the case is (ir)relevant to the instantiation of the concept. Therefore,
we may formulate this requirement as follows:
(JS) X’s Intuition on particular cases involving the concept C is a reliable source of 
evidence only if X possesses C.
Moreover, from JS and CP it follows that one’s intuition on particular cases involving 
the concept C is a reliable source of evidence only if one would have true intuitions 
presupposing corresponding concept-identities. Thus, so far, the moral is that to possess 
a concept it is necessary to have the true supporting concept-identity proposition; 
otherwise, our intuitions on the case would be unreliable.
2. Objections and Clarifications
2.1. Sarch’s Objection to CP
Against CP, we may highlight Sarch (2010) argument based on the possibility of genuine 
conflict on a wide range of cases. Accordingly, if CP were true, then it would be impossible 
for there to be genuine conflict on intuitions on particular cases between two people who 
possess the very same concept. The reason is that if two people both possess the very same 
concept, then according to the above-mentioned condition, they both have true intuitions 
presupposing that the corresponding identities are true (false), if true (false); and thereby 
they apply the same concept-identities to all relevant particular cases. So, the resultant 
intuitive judgments on a wide range of particular cases would be the same, assuming that 
both people are fully informed about the cases. According to him, for example, even a much 
weaker account such as Bealer’s entails that if a person with Kantian morality and a person 
with Utilitarian morality both possess the very same concept of Moral Rightness, they would 
not disagree on a wide range of particular moral cases, since they both agree on the 
underlying concept-identities. But, he objects, “it clearly does seem possible for two people 
to determinately possess the same concept of moral rightness while in ideal cognitive 
conditions and still have intuitions that genuinely conflict on a wide range of particular 
cases.” (p. 469)      
This possibility entails that it is possible for two people to possess the same concept 
while at least one of them intuits incorrectly in some particular cases. But if we take this 
possibility seriously, we are left with a mystery: How may two people both possess a concept 
at all in a way that is compatible with genuine conflict on intuitions on some instances of the 
concept? If the first possesses the concept in question as the second does, then what 
cognitive diversity prevents either one from correctly intuiting on relevant particular cases at 
all, provided that they both are also fully informed of the case? If we take this objection 
seriously, it is left unanswerable how and why these two genuinely disagree on a wide range 
of cases, despite the facts that they possess (determinately, using Bealer’s terminology) the 
very same concept and that they captured the relevant features of the cases in question.    
Despite Sarch, it seems the natural explanation for conflict on intuitions on particular 
cases is that the more diverse intuitions the two people have on particular cases, the more 
difference is there between the two people regarding possession of the concept in question. 
Wide range of disagreement is much more significant than Sarch supposes to be: It is a 
symptom of difference between the concepts possessed by the two, or it indicates that at 
least one of them does not possess the concept as determinately as the other does, assuming
of course, that both sides have fully understood the controversial cases. 
We see no explanation for genuine conflict on particular cases as straightforward as 
the one given above. Appealing to maneuvers such as inability to apply the possessed 
concept to particular cases sounds more like a disappointing ad hoc attempt, rather than a 
unifying and genuine explanation for apparent disagreement. Unless there appears a good 
explanation, which it is not clear to us what it can be, it is more plausible to adhere to the 
conclusion that conflicting subjects do not possess the very same concept.        
2.2. In Support of CP and JS
In this sub-section, we are going to provide some further support for the necessary 
condition for concept possession and reliability of intuition as mentioned in CP and JS.
2.2.1. In what follows CP and JS are illustrated and supported more through 
examples in which to intuit justifiably on particular cases we see first, as JS implies, it is 
necessary to possess the corresponding concept; and moreover to possess the concept, as 
CP implies, it is necessary to presuppose the corresponding concept-identities.      
(1)  Suppose someone justifiedly intuits that 6 is an even number. We may ask “In 
virtue of what does he justifiedly intuit this singular proposition?” Partly in virtue of 
understanding the concepts constituting the proposition among which is the concept 
Evenness. To justifiedly judge that 6 is an even number, it is necessary to know that Evenness = 
Being-divisible- by-2. It seems too odd to claim that one may justifiedly or reliably judge on 
evenness of many even numbers without possessing that the concept of Evenness is identical 
to the concept of Being-divisible- by-2. Clearly facing the question why to put 6 but not 5 under 
the category of even numbers, the natural (not artificial) response would be “because being 
an even number is just being divisible by 2 and 6 but not 5 possesses the property of being 
divisible by 2; and thereby 6 but not 5 is an even number.”
A crucial point, however, is that knowing that Evenness is identical to Divisibility-by-2
does not necessitate being able to utter the corresponding concept-identity-sentence. In other 
words, it is one thing to understand and intuit the proposition that 6 is an even number as
presupposing that Evenness = Being-divisible- by-2, and it is another to have the disposition or 
to be able to utter the sentence “Evenness = Being-divisible- by-2” as required. One may grasp 
the proposition involving the concept Evenness while he does not know to which concept the 
term “even” refers (this caveat also applies to subsequent examples).  
(2) As another example, let us take another look at Bealer’s example of multigon: A 
woman introduces the term “multigon”7 and applies it to various closed plane figures while 
she possesses the concept of Multigon. Suppose that either multigon = being a closed 
straight-sided plane figure, or multigon = being a closed straight-sided plane figure with five 
or more sides. (Bealer 1999, p. 39). Considering the question whether a given triangle is a 
multigon, she would have intuition that the triangle is a multigon only if he had already 
introduced the term “multigon” so that being a multigon = being a closed straight-sided 
plane figure; but would have intuition that triangle is not a multigon only if for example 
multigon = being a closed straight-sided plane figure with five or more sides. Again as 
mentioned in the previous example, she may fully understand the term and has a definite 
concept of Multigon corresponding to the term while she is not well-prepared to explicate or 
verbalize the corresponding concept-identity statement 
                                                          
7 “Multigon” is the hypothetical terms used by Bealer as the counterfactual counterpart for “polygon”. The definition 
referred in the text is adapted from Webster.
(3) A person, upon mentally constructing one of Gettier’s cases, intuits the case is not 
an instance of Knowledge. A natural account for her intuitive judgment, we think, is to say that 
she intuits so partly because she understands the term “knowledge” so that Knowledge ≠ 
Justified-true-belief. In a counterfactual situation, if she had, no matter for which reason, taken 
for granted that Knowledge = Justified-true-belief, she would have, upon fully understanding 
Gettier’s hypothetical cases, intuited otherwise. 
Essentially, there is no fundamental difference between the three examples above. 
Each example contains intuition on a particular case and a supporting concept-identity.
Common among all three examples is that justified particular intuition involves possessing 
the corresponding concept (Evenness, Multigon, Knowledge) and the latter involves 
presupposition of a concept-identity-proposition. Therefore, we see that only by satisfying JS
and CP the subject’s intuitions on relevant particular cases are deemed justified.  
Of course, we do admit that in philosophical practice, as in the last example, the 
necessity of the presence of the concept-identity in the background of intuitive-philosophical 
judgment is not as obvious and as clear as in the mathematical cases (otherwise the present 
paper would be totally redundant!). That we may readily admit that in the mathematical 
examples above concept-identities support particular-case-intuitions while we are not so sure 
in the epistemological case, can be explained away by appealing to the fact that concepts in 
mathematics, or at least basic and simple ones such as “polygon” (or its counterpart 
“multigon” in Bealer’s scenario) and “evenness”, are considerably more definite than 
philosophical concept such as Knowledge, Causation etc. and thereby such mathematical 
concepts are relatively well-defined and well-phrased. To possess the concept of Polygon, one 
has to possess relatively definite concepts such as Closed, Straight-sided and Plane-figure as 
normally understood; however to possess the concept of Knowledge involves possessing at 
least the concepts of Belief, Truth, and Justification, clearly none of which is as clear as 
mathematical ones. (Otherwise, there would not be such huge literature through the history 
of philosophy published on analysis of these concepts!). No one can understand the content 
of the predicate “knowledge” if one cannot understand the content of the predicate “truth”,
where the latter is clearly not as clear as those simple and definite mathematical concepts.8
2.2.2. We may reach the same conclusion by appealing to another line of argument. 
Suppose, on Friday night when Smith is wearing a yellow shirt he knows there is a table 
before him. We may ask ourselves why does this case intuitively satisfy Knowledge? The 
natural response would include highlighting some relevant properties of the case, namely the 
fact that he believes that there is a table before him, the fact that actually there is a table 
before him, and the fact that he is perceptually aware of the table being before him, among 
other things; but would not include irrelevant facts such as his weight, his eyes’ color, the day 
of the week etc. Why do we pick out particular properties of the case, but not others, as 
relevant?
Because we presuppose a background and perhaps implicit theory prior to intuiting that 
such and such a case is (not) an instance of Knowledge. In Smith’s example about knowledge, 
the background theory implies, among other things, that for being knowledge of P, it is 
necessary to truly believe that P. Suppose for the sake argument, that the JTB-theory is our 
presupposed theory at the time of intuiting that Smith knows there is a table before him and 
that JTB-theory, in fact, is true. It does not matter us, say, whether he is wearing a yellow 
shirt or a black one because the presupposed theory generally excludes these properties as 
irrelevant to having knowledge; but it does matter us whether Smith is in a good cognitive 
condition or not because the JTB-theory implies so. Or in the Gettier’s second case, the 
reason we, along with Gettier, do not care whether or not the Jones and Smith are brothers 
but do care whether Jones, in fact, owns a Ford is that our presupposed theory excludes the 
former but somehow includes the latter9.  To include some property as relevant and exclude 
others as irrelevant is nothing but to assume a background theory, maybe of course still an 
                                                          
8 Here it is assumed for the sake of example that Knowledge entails truth.
9 Our response to this objection may also bring about challenges to the supposed role of philosophical theories: If 
for reliable intuitions, which provide us with evidence for or against theories, it is necessary to presuppose a true
concept-identity-proposition and this proposition itself proposes an analysis of the concept in question, then it seems 
we are bounded in a epistemic circle: There must be a theory to support our particular intuitions while the intuition 
is supposed to provide us with evidence for or against theories in return. It is a complicated subject and we do not 
intend to enter it.
implicit one. Therefore it is the background theory in the form of a concept-identity C = F 
that dictates us, implicitly or explicitly, which properties to exclude and which properties to 
include. 
Other attempts to explain (away) the profound distinction between the class of 
relevant and the class of irrelevant properties of a given case, such as appealing to the 
thought that it is merely the concept possessed itself, independent of any theory, that 
dictates us which case-property to include and which to exclude, sound nothing more than a 
verbal manipulation of our argument above. To include the properties F-ness and G-ness
and only these properties as relevant to a case being an instance of C is, in fact, nothing 
beyond presupposition of an analyzing theory in the form “C = F & G” while intuiting on a 
case of C.             
3. Conclusion 
We can review the argument as follows:
1. If intuition is not a reliable source of evidence, then the counterexample method 
is not tenable; for in armchair methodology it heavily and unavoidably relies on 
intuitive evidence. (Epistemic Requirement)
2. If intuition is a reliable source of evidence, then having intuitive evidence involves 
(determinately) possessing the concept C, the concept under discussion. (JS)
3. If having intuitive evidence involves (determinately) possessing the concept C,
then either it is the same as the concept designated by the “C” in the to-be-
criticized theory or not. (Semantic Requirement) 
4. If the concept C constituting the intuitive evidence is not the same as the concept 
designated by “C” in the theory, then even if the evidence is true, it is irrelevant. 
5. If the concept C constituting the intuitive evidence is the same as the concept 
designated by “C” in the theory, then if the critic possesses the concept C
determinately enough, there is no epistemic need to rely on counterexample 
evidence to assess the theory; because one already know the concept-identity of 
the form “F = G” or its negation. (From CP) 
6. If one already knows the true corresponding concept-identity, then the 
counterexample method is needless.  
Therefore, the counterexample method is either epistemologically untenable or 
needless, if not irrelevant to the subject. As an initial guess, the most the 
counterexample method may serve is to reveal that perhaps our verbalization of our 
presupposed theory is not proper. Of course, it is still a naïve guess requiring more 
contemplation.   
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